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1. INTRODUCTION
The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry is under-
going a rapid transformation due to the emergence of sev-
eral commercial applications, projected to surpass military
spending in the coming years [Frost & Sullivan, 2011].
The rapid growth period of the past years, mainly driven
by research and development (R&D) projects will fuel a
second industrial boom, the commercial and civil drone
market is expected to develop strongly during the next
few years and could reach 2 billion dollars by 2015, driven
by new technological capabilities, lower production costs
and changes to the regulatory framework.
The main barrier for the widespread use of UAVs is
their inability to routinely access the common airspace,
which is a combination of legal and technical challenges.
They lack the hundred years of operational experience of
conventional aircraft, hence they pose a significant risk for
air traffic and for the humans on the ground. More than
400 large U.S. military drones crashed in major accidents
worldwide between Sept. 11, 2001, and December 2013
Whitlock [2014].
During its first dozen years of existence, the MQ-1 Preda-
tor crashed at an extraordinarily high rate for every
100,000 hours flown, it was involved in 13.7 Class A ac-
cidents. Since 2009, as the Air Force has become more
experienced at flying drones, the mishap rate for Predators
has fallen to 4.79 Class A accidents for every 100,000
flight hours. The MQ-9 Reaper has fared better than the
Predator, partially thanks to its triple redundant flight
control system and the more rigorous systems engineering
approach behind it, incurring 3.17 Class A mishaps per
100,000 hours over the five years of 2009-2013. Air Force
officials pointed out that the crash rate for Reapers now
approaches the standard set by two fighter jets, the F-16
and F-15, which over the past five years have posted Class
A mishap rates of 1.96 and 1.47 respectively, according to
statistics from the Air Force Safety Center at Kirtland Air
Force Base in New Mexico.
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The civil sector is seeing improved capability at a lower
price also, largely due to the availability of commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. But the wast majority of
the civil applications do not require, and unable to afford,
large platforms where redundancy similar to commercial
aircraft fly-by-wire systems can be realised.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has yet to
propose rules to govern the use of commercial robotic
aircraft in U.S. skies. But it predicts that 7,500 unmanned
craft weighing 55 pounds (25 kilograms) or less will be
operating in the U.S. by 2018. There is strong interest
from agriculture, mining, and infrastructure companies in
using drones for tasks like inspecting crops or gathering
geospatial data.
The European Union also called for action to enable the
progressive integration of UAVs into civil airspace from
2016 onwards. The report European Commission [2014]
focuses on UAVs for civil use and responds to the call of the
European manufacturing and service industry to remove
barriers to the introduction of UAVs in the European
single market.
Some of the key technologies are not yet available to allow
for the safe integration of RPAS. R&D efforts are focused
on the validation of these technologies. R&D is carried
out by different research programmes managed by various
organisations around the world including FAA, EASA,
NASA, Eurocontrol and others. The technologies which
need further development and validation according to the
consensus of these stakeholders are:
• Command and control, including spectrum allocation
and management;
• Detect and avoid technologies;
• Security protection against physical, electronic or
cyber-attacks;
• Transparent and harmonized contingency procedures;
• Decision capabilities to ensure standardized and pre-
dictable behaviour in all phases of flight; and
• Human factor issues such as piloting.
The present article provides an approach on designing
and assessing the overall reliability of these small, and
affordable UAVs to help understanding the inherent de-
sign tradeoffs in systems engineering. The main challenge
is to combine hardware redundancy with analytical re-
dundancy based fault tolerant control, which provides
Fig. 1. The FASER UAV with the control surfaces labeled
(A – aileron, F – flap, E – elevator, R – rudder).
the required reliability at the lowest cost and system
weight/complexity. The control system layout, control de-
sign assumptions and the flight control surface architecture
influenced by faults are considered within this article.
Clear trade-offs are established between possible tolerable
faults, the layout of flight control surfaces and the overall
reliability of various candidate UAV architectures.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Based on the observations in the previous section a method
is proposed to assess the reliability of various UAV design
architectures without the need of extensive flight testing.
The proposed method is of general nature but a case study
of a small-scale low-cost UAV is used as an example for
the concepts and calculations. This is the FASER UAV of
the UMN AEM which is based on an Ultra Stick 120 air-
frame and for which a simulation environment is available.
The centerpiece of the environment is the high-fidelity
nonlinear six degrees-of-freedom model of the UltraStick
120 aircraft. The aerodynamic parameters in this model
were estimated based on wind tunnel tests conducted at
the NASA Langley Research Center [Owens et al. [2006],
Hoe et al. [2012]]. The simulation environment and the
flight control computer allow for extensive software-in-
the-loop and processor-in-the-loop simulations of the air-
craft model. The entire simulation environment, details
about the aircraft fleet, components, wiring, and data from
numerous flight tests have been made open-source and
can be freely downloaded from this website University of
Minnesota [2014].
The goal of the current study is to assess the impact
of various actuator architectures on the overall system
reliability. This is achieved by estimating the probability
of catastrophic failure of the aircraft which is defined by
the inability to fly the aircraft to a proper landing site.
The failure rate of the actuators is much greater than
the other units due to the wear of the moving parts, and
usually they make up more than half of the components in
number, so they can be considered the greatest contributor
to the overall reliability of a UAV. In case of an actuator
failure a path must be generated from any starting point
to the landing site, which requires, at the minimum, the
ability to fly straight with a constant altitude, turn by a
specified turning radius (at constant altitude) and descend
with a specified flight path angle. These requirements
can be formulated together by specifying a minimal flight
Fig. 2. Tail of the FASER UAV with the control surfaces
labeled (E – elevator, R – rudder).
envelope in the γ – ψ˙ plane which contains the points
corresponding to the above conditions.
In case of engine failure the aircraft can glide to a safe
landing spot if it is in the glide slope, so only servo
faults are considered in this context. The failure cases of
a servo are mainly the jamming or runaway of a control
surface, limitations due to excessive loads, degradation
of deflection rates and oscillatory failure [Goupil [2010]].
The last three failure modes are more common in large
aircrafts where larger loads are present and resonance can
occur because of the aeroelastic behaviour of the airframe.
Jamming and runaway failures can occur in small aircrafts
and can lead to catastrophic failures. Runaway failures are
considered an extreme case of jamming at the maximum
or minimum deflection, so the assessment is based on the
jamming fault mode.
The UltraStick 120 has eight unique aerodynamic control
surfaces: split elevators (E1, E2), split rudders (R1, R2),
ailerons (A1, A2), and flaps (F1, F2). These control sur-
faces are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Each of the eight aero-
dynamic control surfaces is actuated by an independent
servo motor. The sign convention of the control surfaces is
as follows. A trailing edge down deflection of the elevators,
ailerons, and flaps is considered positive. A trailing edge
left deflection of the rudders is considered positive. In addi-
tion, all the surfaces have a deflection range [−25◦,+25◦].
Increasing the number of servos on an aircraft increases
reliability, if the architecture is properly designed, but it
also adds to the cost and weight of the system. To ana-
lyze this trade-off, five actuator architectures are defined
below for the FASER aircraft for which the probability of
catastrophic failure is estimated in Section 5.
v0. coupled ailerons, single elevator, single rudder, cou-
pled flaps (4 servos)
v1. decoupled ailerons, single elevator, single rudder, no
flaps (4 servos)
v2. coupled ailerons, split elevators, single rudder, no
flaps (4 servos)
v3. coupled ailerons, single elevator, single rudder, no
flaps (3 servos)
v4. decoupled ailerons, single elevator, no rudder, no flaps
(3 servos)
These configurations will hereafter be referred to as v0,
. . . , v4. The configuration v0 is only used for flight
envelope assessment in Section 4. The eight different
control surfaces of the UltraStick are coupled differently
depending on the actuator configuration. As an example,
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Fig. 3. Aircraft path during area scanning mission.
for the v0 configuration, A1 = −A2, E1 = E2, R1 = R2,
and F1 = F2.
Our analysis makes several simplifying assumptions to
make the analysis tractable in the early design phase.
First, it is assumed that an FDI algorithm is used to
detect actuator faults, but only statistical properties like
missed detection and false alarm ratios are considered,
dynamic properties like detection time are neglected at
this point. It is also assumed that a reconfigurable control
law is used that can stabilize the aircraft after a fault if the
aircraft remains trimmable. Hence, if a trim point can be
found after a fault has occurred, it is assumed that that
trim point can be reached without loss of control. Only
single faults are considered as multiple faults occurring
at the same time have negligible probabilities compared
to them. Another assumption is that the deflection of a
control surface (therefore the probability of failure for a
control surface) is independent of time, which enables us
to use time-independent distributions in the calculations.
The determination of trim points requires an aerodynamic
model of the aircraft and the failure probability calculation
requires the knowledge of the reliability of a single servo
(usually expressed by the Mean Time Between Failure -
MTBF).
The analysis method has three distinct steps:
• acquiring control surface distributions
• determining flight envelopes and stuck surface ranges
• estimating the probability of catastrophic failure
The probability distributions of control surface deflections
are used to compute the probability of a surface being
stuck in the range where faults cannot be tolerated. The
ranges for each surface are determined by discovering the
flight envelopes for actuator jamming faults and relating
them with the minimal flight envelope. The probability
of catastrophic failure is then estimated by summing the
probabilities of the surfaces being stuck in the range where
faults cannot be tolerated.
3. DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL SIGNALS
Determining the distribution of the aircraft’s control sig-
nals is needed for the evaluation of the final probability
of failure. These distribution functions are influenced by
several factors, including the mission profile, the control
algorithm and exogenous disturbances (sensor noise, wind
gusts and atmospheric turbulence). Control algorithms
play a large part in forming the distributions and therefore
in the reliability of a UAV. Using the rudder for coordi-
nated turns or simply yaw rate damping results in different
control signal characteristics, just like using symmetrically
coupled or decoupled ailerons. Controller dynamics also
affect the shape of the distributions, a conservative con-
troller yields small variance around the trim point, while a
more agile controller results in the deflections more spread
out.
Histograms of control surface deflections can be plotted
from flight data or simulations, then probability density
functions can be estimated for these histograms. Gen-
erating the histograms directly from measurements may
not always be practical because it would require flight
tests for every mission profile considered. The mission
profile, in fact, can be broken down into different elements
like straight-level flight, banked turns and steady ascents
and descents. If the distributions of the control signals
are known for these modes the overall distributions can
be constructed by combining them with weighting that
accounts for the probability of being in each mode during
the mission:
pi(δ) = pi(δ|mode = 1)p(mode = 1) + . . .
+ pi(δ|mode = n)p(mode = n), (1)
where pi(δ|mode = n) is the probability distribution
function of the ith control surface during mode n and
p(mode = n) is the probability of being in mode n. This
way histograms obtained from one mission profile can be
used to generate histograms for another one and the effect
of different profiles on UAV reliability can be evaluated.
Figure 3 shows a typical area scanning path for the FASER
UAV obtained from the SIL simulation (duration is 588 s).
It consists of three modes: straight level flight and left
and right banked turns. Figures 4 and 5 show the dis-
tributions of the control surfaces for the mission. Normal
distributions are fitted to ailerons and elevators as they are
approximately Gaussian while rudder distributions appear
to be multi-modal and cannot be characterized so easily.
Aileron trim values are expected to be near zero degrees
(transitioning to a turn needs aileron deflections but once
the roll demand is achieved the aileron returns to zero
degrees), the small differences are caused by the correcting
action due to the motor torque. On the other hand, the
elevator trim is affected by the turn to produce more lift,
as can be seen by a change of 1.03 degrees. The variances
of the distributions are somewhat greater in the turns.
Rudder distributions are different in the two modes: for
the straight flight they are symmetrical but for the turn
one of the side lobes is missing. The reason for this is that
only right turns were used to generate the histograms while
the straight flight contained both positive and negative
initial errors for which the autopilot used the rudder in
both directions. The same histograms were generated with
a control law that does not use the rudder which are not
shown here (they are required by one of the configurations
analysed in Section 5).
The probabilities of being in each mode can be estimated
from the mission profile. For the area scanning mission
the ratio of the time spent in straight flight and in turns
can be calculated from the geometry of the scanned area
and the distance between the scanning lines. For the path
shown in Figure 3 the waypoints are 1000 m apart in the
North and 200 m apart in the East direction. The resulting
probabilities are 0.13 for both left and right turns and 0.74
for straight flight.
Fig. 4. Control surface distributions during line segment following.
Fig. 5. Control surface distributions during circular orbit following (right turns only).
4. FLIGHT ENVELOPE ASSESSMENT
4.1 Introduction
This section gives a cursory introduction to aircraft flight
envelopes, since this concept is important for the subse-
quent section. The aircraft equations of motion [Nelson
[1998], Cook [2007]] can be described in the nonlinear
state-space form as shown in equations 2 and 3.
x˙ = f(x, u) (2)
y = h(x, u) (3)
In these equations, x ∈ Rn is the state vector, u ∈ Rm
is the input vector, and y ∈ Rp is the output vector. In
addition, f : Rn × Rm → Rn is the state function and
h : Rn×Rm → Rp is the output function. The state vector
is: x = [φ, θ, ψ, p, q, r, u, v, w]T . Here, φ, θ, and ψ are the
Euler angles of the aircraft. The aircraft’s angular velocity
components in the body-fixed frame are: roll rate (p),
pitch rate (q), and yaw rate (r). The airspeed components
in the body-fixed frame are u, v, and w. We also define
a reduced order state vector that does not contain ψ:
xr = [φ, θ, p, q, r, u, v, w]
T . xr is used in the definitions of
the flight envelopes.
For configuration v0, there are only four unique aerody-
namic inputs. In addition, the throttle for the motor is
τ . Consequently, the input vector is u = [τ, E,R,A, F ].
As expected, the input vector will change appropriately,
depending on the actuator configuration. The studies con-
ducted in this paper make use of certain elements in the
output vector (y). The airspeed, angle of attack, and angle
of sideslip are denoted by V, α, and β, respectively. The
flight path climb angle and heading rate are denoted by γ
and ψ˙, respectively.
Aircraft typically fly around equilibrium or trim points.
These are operating points at which some state derivatives
are zero, and others have constant values. The collection
of all such trim points defines the steady flight envelope
(F) of the aircraft, as shown in equation 4.
F = {(x¯, u¯) : ˙¯xr = 0, ˙¯u = 0} (4)
A subset of the flight envelope is straight and level flight,
i.e. unaccelerated flight at constant altitude. This subset is
mathematically described in equation 5. The key property
of this subset is the zero flight path angle (γ¯ = 0).
Fstraight,level = {(x¯, u¯) : f(x¯, u¯) = 0, p¯ = q¯ = r¯ = 0,
γ¯ = 0, ˙¯u = 0} (5)
Level flight is, by definition, at constant altitude. When
the aircraft descends steadily, at a constant negative flight
path angle (γ¯ < 0), the envelope is described by equation
6.
Fsteady,descent = {(x¯, u¯) : f(x¯, u¯) = 0, p¯ = q¯ = r¯ = 0,
γ¯ < 0, ˙¯u = 0} (6)
Another subset of the flight envelope is steady banked
turns at constant altitude. A steady banked turn is defined
by a constant heading rate (ψ˙). Left banked turns are
described by a negative ψ˙ and right banked turns are de-
scribed by a positive ψ˙. These subsets are mathematically
defined in equations 7 and 8.
Fbanked,left = {(x¯, u¯) : ˙¯xr = 0, ψ˙ < 0,
γ¯ = 0, ˙¯u = 0} (7)
Fbanked,right = {(x¯, u¯) : ˙¯xr = 0, ψ˙ > 0,
γ¯ = 0, ˙¯u = 0} (8)
These subsets can be computed by applying numerical
optimization techniques to the nonlinear aircraft model
that was introduced in section 2. The nonlinear aircraft
model can be trimmed and linearized, using routines
developed in-house, at any operating point within the
flight envelope. For straight & level flight, operating points
are best expressed as pairs of (V, α). A rectangular grid
of such (V, α) pairs is generated for V ∈ [10, 40]m/s and
α ∈ [0◦, 20◦]. The grid resolution is 0.1m/s and 0.1◦ for
V and α, respectively. The nominal flight condition for
the UltraStick 120 is (V, α) = (23m/s, 4.72◦). The trim
routine is called at each grid point after being initialized
with the nominal flight condition. For a specific subset,
the trim routine finds the minimum of a nonlinear, multi-
variable cost function subject to the appropriate constraint
(equations 5 – 8). Matlab’s Optimization Toolbox contains
the fmincon function that is well suited for this purpose.
This optimization problem is non-convex and, in general,
has multiple local minima. The fmincon function returns
the minima that is closest to the initial condition.
A limited longitudinal flight envelope assessment of the Ul-
traStick 120 is presented next. This is followed by analyses
to determine the range of allowable stuck surface faults
for the UltraStick 120 versions introduced in Section 2.
While a flight envelope assessment is not required per say
to determine the allowable stuck surface faults, it gives
valuable insight into the distribution of trim points across
different flight conditions. This insight will be useful for
future work involving reconfigurable control design.
Freeman and Balas [2014] conducted a similar trim state
discovery for the UltraStick 120. The work presented in
this paper draws on the results and conclusions outlined
in Freeman and Balas [2014] and connects them to the
probability of catastrophic failure in section 5. A more
thorough treatment of aircraft flight envelopes can be
found in McClamroch [2011], Wilborn and Foster [2004],
Urnes et al. [2008].
4.2 Longitudinal flight envelope for configuration v0
A limited flight envelope assessment is presented only for
configuration v0. The envelope corresponding to longitu-
dinal straight & level flight can be used to determine the
stuck ranges for the elevator and flaps. This envelope is
shown in the V × α plane in figure 6 and in the F × E
plane in figure 7. Trim points are marked by colored crosses
in both these figures. In figure 6, the trim points are
colored based on the value of the flap deflection. There are
several interesting observations. First, as expected, there
is an inverse relationship between V and α. Trim points at
high airspeeds have low α and vice-versa. Second, since a
nonlinear aircraft model is being trimmed, the inputs and
outputs are implicitly constrained. As a result, the flight
envelope has well-defined boundaries, as seen in figure 6.
The high speed boundary is a collection of trim points that
define the highest achievable airspeeds and lowest achiev-
able angles of attack. Conversely, at the stall boundary,
the stall angle of attack (approximately 15◦) is reached at
low airspeeds. The high speed and stall boundaries are due
to output constraints. The other two boundaries are due
to input saturation. The TE up flap boundary defines trim
points for which flaps are deflected to −25◦ (trailing edge
up). The TE down flap boundary defines trim points for
which flaps are deflected to +25◦ (trailing edge down). It is
interesting to note that within these boundaries, fixed flap
deflections define isolines that follow the general shape of
the envelope. Although this envelope is plotted for config-
uration v0, the envelopes for other configurations can be
extracted by looking at certain isolines. As an example,
consider configuration v3, where no flaps are used. The
flight envelope for this configuration would simply be the
green isoline for F = 0 shown in figure 6.
In figure 7, the trim points are colored based on the
value of α. Three important conclusions can be drawn
from this figure. Firstly, it is seen that trim points exist
for the entire range of flap deflections, as shown by the
TE up/down flap boundaries. Secondly, there are no trim
points for a positively deflected elevator. This implies that
if the elevator was to get stuck positively, the result would
be a catastrophic failure of the aircraft. As an example,
for configuration v3 (F = 0), trim points exist for the
elevator range [−25◦,−4◦]. It is seen that, for any given
flap deflection, the high speed boundary is reached when
the elevator is deflected to its highest trimmable value.
Conversely, the stall boundary is reached for the lowest
trimmable value of the elevator.
Lastly, it is seen that there are more trim points, that are
more spread out, for E ∈ [−10◦, 0◦]. This also happens
to be the low α region (α ∈ [0, 9◦]). Although nothing
formal is derived in this paper, it can be reasoned that
reconfigurable control laws will have a better chance of
recovering the aircraft with an elevator failure in this
range. On the other hand, the availability of trim points
is sparse in the high alpha region (E ∈ [−15◦,−25◦]).
This will likely have an adverse impact on reconfigurable
control. While flight envelopes are insightful and help
visualize the distribution of trim points, they are not
necessary to simply determine the allowable stuck surface
ranges. In the next section, a more direct approach is taken
in order to determine the allowable stuck surface ranges for
each actuator configuration.
4.3 Allowable stuck surface ranges
A stuck surface fault is called allowable if the aircraft can
safely fly home in the presence of this fault. In order to
safely fly home, the aircraft should be able to execute some
limited maneuvers. The flight envelope subsets, that were
defined in section 4.1, can be used to describe these limited
maneuvers. The aircraft should be able to fly straight and
level, execute either left or right banked turns with some
minimum ψ˙, and descend steadily at some minimum γ.
These limited maneuvers together form the minimal flight
envelope. This can be visualized in the γ – ψ˙ plane, as
shown in figure 8. It is reasoned that as long as the actual
flight envelope, in the presence of a stuck fault, is larger
than this minimal flight envelope, the aircraft can safely
fly home.
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Fig. 8. Minimal flight envelope
For this research, the minimum required turning radius
was selected as 87m. This corresponds to a heading rate
of ±13◦/s at a nominal airspeed of V = 20m/s. The
minimum required flight path angle is chosen as γ = −3◦
since this is representative of typical glide slopes. The four
points shown in figure 8 define two triangles: Fminimal,left
Table 1. Allowable stuck surface ranges
Config. Elevator(s) Rudder(s) Aileron(s)
v1 [-25,-1] [-25,+25] [-25,+25]
v2 [-25,+25] [-25,+25] [-11,+12]
v3 [-25,-4] [-25,+25] [-7,+10]
v4 [-25,-1] N/A [-25,+25]
and Fminimal,right. Furthermore, it is assumed that if trim
points exist at the vertices of either of these two triangles,
trim points exist in all of the corresponding triangle.
Hence, it is sufficient to check for the existence of trim
points at the vertices of the two triangles.
For any given stuck fault, in order to safely fly home,
at least one trim point needs to be found in each of the
subsets Fstraight,level and Fsteady,descent, and either of the
subsets Fbanked,left and Fbanked,right. In other words, a
stuck fault is called allowable if trim points can be found
either in Fminimal,left or Fminimal,right. In checking for the
existence of trim points, no explicit constraints (such as a
zero sideslip angle requirement) are placed on V, α, and β.
The following steps describe the calculation of the allow-
able stuck surface ranges. First, the trimmable range for
each surface is calculated at each of the four points shown
in figure 8. Then, the intersection of these trimmable
ranges is calculated between Fstraight,level, Fsteady,descent,
and Fbanked,left. This intersection is called the trimmable
range for Fminimal,left. In a similar way, the trimmable
range for Fminimal,right is calculated. The union of
Fminimal,left and Fminimal,right is defined as the allowable
stuck surface range.
The allowable stuck surface ranges for v1 through v4 are
given in Table 1. For configurations that have a single
elevator (v1,v3,v4), it is seen that the range is never
positive, i.e. no trim points exist for positively stuck
elevator. However, the allowable range is [−25◦,+25◦]
when split elevators are present (v2). Another interesting
observation is that stuck rudder faults can always be
tolerated as long as no explicit constraints are placed on
β. Lastly, decoupled ailerons (v1 and v4) have the full
allowable range as compared to coupled ailerons (v2 and
v3). The allowable stuck surface ranges presented here
in conjunction with the distribution of control signals,
presented in section 3, allow for the computation of the
probability of catastrophic failure for each of the four
configurations.
5. PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
The final step of the assessment is the calculation of the
probability of catastrophic failure. It is computed as the
sum of the probabilities of a control surface getting stuck
outside its allowable range. In addition to this, the missed
detection and false alarm events of the FDI algorithm can
be included in the calculation on a probabilistic basis.
These events can be illustrated in a fault tree (figure
9), which decomposes system level failure into lower-level
events of the failure of the servo and the FDI algorithm’s
decisions about the servo’s state. Events that lead to
catastrophic failure are marked as red, other events are
marked with green. The events of missed detection and
false alarm can be characterized with the conditional
probabilities PMD = P (missed det. | servo failure) and
PFA = P (false alarm | no servo failure).
From the distribution functions obtained in Section 3 the
probability of a control surface being in a given range
can be computed. The probability that the ith surface is
outside the allowable range [l u] is given by:
Poutside,i = P (δi > u ∨ δi < l) = 1−
∫ u
l
pi(δi)dδi. (9)
The probability of the ith surface getting stuck outside the
allowable range is obtained by multiplying this with the
servo failure rate q = 1/MTBF . The total probability of
catastrophic failure is given by summing the contributions
for all control surfaces:
PSY S =
N∑
i=1
qPoutside,i, (10)
where N is the number of control surfaces.
Missed detections lead to catastrophic failure because
the control algorithm cannot reconfigure to accommodate
the fault, both when the fault is inside and outside the
allowable range. The case when the fault is outside the
range is already included in equation 10, so only servo
faults inside the allowable range have to be considered:
PSY S, MD = PSY S +
N∑
i=1
q(1− Poutside,i)PMD. (11)
Contrary, false alarms lead to catastrophic failure only
outside the allowable range, since the faults inside the
range can be tolerated by the controller, even if they
come from false alarms. Since the false alarm probability
has meaning only in case of there is no servo fault, the
probability indicating this case must be included in its
calculation:
PSY S, MD, FA = PSY S, MD +
N∑
i=1
(1− q)Poutside,iPFA.
(12)
However, dynamic properties of the FDI algorithm like
detection time cannot be included in the analysis this way.
The probability of catastrophic failure has been evaluated
for the four configurations of the FASER UAV defined in
Section 2. Figure 10 shows the probabilities in function of
servo MTBF with fixed missed detection and false alarm
rates. Figures 11 and 12 show them in function of missed
detection and false alarm rate with fixed servo MTBF and
fixed false alarm and missed detection rate, respectively.
The servo MTBF values for the evaluation are chosen so
that they range from a common R/C-grade servo Murtha
[2009] to a high-fidelity unit used on large military UAVs
of the Secretary of Defense [2003]. The MTBF of high-
fidelity servos for small UAVs, like the ones from Volz,
are somewhere between these values GmbH [2009]. The
missed detection and false alarm rates are chosen to be
PMD = 0.05 and PFA = 0.01 [reference needed]. There is
a trade-off between these two properties, i.e. choosing one
of them to be smaller increases the value of the other for
a given FDI algorithm.
Configuration v3 has the lowest level of reliability, its prob-
ability of failure is two magnitudes higher than that of the
other designs. This configuration has no split surfaces and
the ailerons are coupled which leaves few possibilities for
reconfiguration, as can be seen from the allowable ranges.
The second-worst is v1 despite having 4 servos, thus it
is an example of an improperly designed architecture.
Compared to v3, one servo is used to decouple the ailerons,
which extends their allowable range to [−25◦,+25◦], but
the elevator range is only slightly improved which still
contributes to system failure. The other two configurations
(v2 with 4 servos and v4 with 3 servos) have similar
Fig. 9. System level failure as a tree of different events
(MD – missed detection, TP – true positive, FA –
false alarm, TN – true negative).
Fig. 10. Probability of failure in fuction of servo MTBF.
reliability, for low servo MTBF v2 is better, but for high
MTBF values v4 performs better. This can be explained
by the fact that using more servos adds more failure modes
to the system, but also have the advantage of adding more
options for the reconfigurable controller. This advantage
overcomes the effect from increased failure modes as servo
quality increases. Thus if higher quality servos can be used
for a UAV, it is worth considering an architecture with
split surfaces, if only low-cost components are affordable,
then a simplified design which minimizes the number of
control surfaces achieves the best reliability.
Figure 11 shows the effect of missed detection rate. The
more servos a configuration has the more its reliability
is affected by missed detection rate, as can be seen from
the slope of the curves. The effect of false alarm rate can
be seen in figure 12. Because the term is proportional to
Poutside, it is most visible on the configurations having the
smallest allowable fault ranges (e.g. v3).
6. CONCLUSION
A method has been proposed for the reliability assessment
of small scale UAVs based on their actuator architecture,
mission profile and on-board control system. The method
is introduced using the case study of the FASER UAV,
for which four actuator configurations have been analysed.
Fig. 11. Probability of failure in fuction of missed detection
rate.
Fig. 12. Probability of failure in fuction of false alarm rate.
Our goal is to compare not just different actuator architec-
tures of the same aircraft but also designs with different
airframes (e.g. a flying wing and a conventional airframe).
The wind tunnel tests of a flying wing UAV at UMN (the
miniMUTT) is in progress, so its high-fidelity aerodynamic
model will soon be available for our studies.
The method can be extended and refined at several points,
largely due to the simplifying assumptions made for the
initial approach. One obvious extension is the incorpora-
tion of motor faults into the analysis. The key assumption
that the trimmable region in a flight envelope is the same
region where the controller can stabilize the system is a
very simplistic one, so our aim is to use a more sophis-
ticated approach for the discovery of flight envelopes in
the future. The assumption that the deflection of control
surfaces is time-independent also has to be revised and a
more rigorous stochastic analysis of the system has to be
carried out. Our plans also include the study of control
system design in respect to overall system reliability.
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